When questions about engaging with Iran come up at my talks and lectures I try to remind the audience that engagement is a two-way thing. Even before the present crisis I had seen little evidence the Iranian government was eager to engage with us. This does not mean we shouldn’t try – even now, we absolutely should – it does mean we need a back-up plan in case negotiations never get started in the first place.

The last few days have offered ample evidence that the people currently running Iran are more interested in scapegoating the West in a bid to cover up their own brutal actions than in engaging on any level. For all the discussion about whether the events of the last two weeks should alter President Barack Obama’s desire to ease America’s long cold war with Tehran, engagement is probably going to have to wait if only because it is hard to see the Iranian government showing much interest in it anytime soon.

First there were Supreme Leader Ali Khameini’s charges that the U.S. and Britain were behind the unrest. Then came President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad’s demand that President Obama “apologize” for his carefully-measured criticisms. Finally, on CNN this afternoon, the Iranian ambassador to Mexico blamed the CIA for the murder of Neda Agha-Soltan, the protestor whose much-viewed death from a sniper’s bullet has made her the face of this would-be revolution. According to the New York Times, one Iranian newspaper is making the even more ludicrous claim that a BBC correspondent had her killed.

The strange thing is that a lot of the people spouting this nonsense may actually believe it. The Middle East has long been especially fertile ground for conspiracy theories – a tendency reinforced by the fact that a few especially wild-sounding plots (the Lavon Affair, Iran-Contra, the fact that Kim Philby really was a spy posing as a journalist) actually were true.

It is easy for us in the West to dismiss the sort of rhetoric that has been coming out of Iran as the credibility-challenged ravings of a regime that has little to fall back on. But anyone familiar with the Middle East knows there is a portion of the population inclined to view the world in this way. I suspect this sudden spate of accusations and conspiracy theories is mainly an effort to rally the regime’s base (in the councils of power as much as, if not more than, in the streets) rather than turn back the protests.

The thing to watch will be the degree of traction the charges achieve, particularly among the young. Just as Republican accusations that Obama is a “socialist” have lacked resonance with younger Americans who remember the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall only as boring stuff they suffered through in history class, so it may be that the demon-like United States conjured by the Iranian leadership will not resonate with the under-40 crowd who have little or no memory of the Shah.

The rhetoric of the last week is also a helpful reminder that Iran’s leaders may have the upper hand, but they are clearly feeling cornered and put-upon. Conspiracy theories allow them to retreat to a familiar world-view at a moment when, from their perspective, everything appears suddenly shaky.

For the people currently running Iran the question is whether the accusations of foreign perfidy will be enough to shore up their power. For America this will be a test of the “Obama Effect”. Will the president’s personal popularity, his visibly measured response and his oft-stated desire to deal respectfully with the Muslim World earn him the credibility and good-will America is going to need? As with everything else in Iran it is too early to say, but the result bears watching.

Watching the unfolding events in Iran it is becoming increasingly difficult to believe that Friday’s presidential election was not rigged. This is not to say that President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad lacks a significant base of popular support. But the widespread unrest in the capital, reports of significant clashes between security forces and supporters of Ahmedinejad’s rival, Mir Hussein Mousavi, in a number of provincial cities, the crackdown on opposition politicians that appears to be taking place and, perhaps most importantly, the clampdown on communications technology and media coverage all make the president’s official 2-to-1 margin of victory seem far from credible.

Iranian elections have sometimes been described as factional disputes among the ruling elite. The vetting system built around the Council of Guardians effectively guarantees that a genuine outsider has little or no chance of standing for office in the Islamic Republic. Thus, what we seem to have here is a palace coup.

To go further than that, however, is to venture far into the realm of speculation and rumor. It will probably be a while – perhaps quite a while indeed – before anyone outside of Iran’s political and military inner circle really knows what has happened over the last few days. Did the Supreme Leader conspire with President Ahmedinejad or has he been pushed aside, relegated to the status of a figurehead? If this was a palace coup who was behind it? The Supreme Leader? Ahmedinejad? The military? The Revolutionary Guards? We have no way of knowing; and the truth, whatever it may be, is likely to emerge only with the passage of time. That may seem obvious, but it should also serve as a note of caution. Moreover, the situation is still developing and changing. Whatever the behind the scenes truth of today is, things may look very different tomorrow or next week – let alone next month or next year.

For a clear timeline of what we can be fairly certain we now know about the palace coup see the June 13 post: “Iran’s Political Coup” at Gary Sick’s blog.

Sick, an Iran specialist at Columbia University who served on the National Security Council staff during the Carter administration, also offers the following analysis:

In 2005, when it appeared that no hard line conservative might survive the first round of the presidential election, there were credible reports of ballot manipulation to insure that Mr Ahmadinejad could run (and win) against former president Rafsanjani in the second round. The lesson seemed to be that the authorities might shift the results in a close election but they would not reverse a landslide vote.

The current election appears to repudiate both of those rules. The authorities were faced with a credible challenger, Mir Hossein Mousavi, who had the potential to challenge the existing power structure on certain key issues. He ran a surprisingly effective campaign, and his “green wave” began to be seen as more than a wave. In fact, many began calling it a Green Revolution. For a regime that has been terrified about the possibility of a “velvet revolution,” this may have been too much. …

It is still too early for anything like a comprehensive analysis of implications, but here are some initial thoughts:

The willingness of the regime simply to ignore reality and fabricate election results without the slightest effort to conceal the fraud represents a historic shift in Iran’s Islamic revolution. All previous leaders at least paid lip service to the voice of the Iranian people. This suggests that Iran’s leaders are aware of the fact that they have lost credibility in the eyes of many (most?) of their countrymen, so they are dispensing with even the pretense of popular legitimacy in favor of raw power.


And that brings us to the other question raised by the events in Iran: what does, or should, it mean for the United States and its announced desire to engage with the Iranian government?

On Meet the Press this morning Vice President Joe Biden was straightforward. “Talks with Iran are not a reward for good behavior,” he said. “Our interests are the same before the election as after the election.” He went on to identify those US interests as making sure Iran does not acquire nuclear weapons and getting Tehran to cease support for terrorism. It was a careful response, one designed neither to welcome a tainted victory nor to close off any particular avenue of contact. This approach has much to recommend it. Refusing to engage with a government we have long disliked because it rigged an election many Americans never expected would be free and fair (albeit the rigging seems to have been far more blatant than most anyone anticipated) seems like an exercise in self-punishment.

Which is not to say the election does not change things. It particular it seems certain to lead to a rethinking of how we deal with Iran. It is, for example, reasonable to ask to what extent a leadership willing to steal an election this openly can be counted upon to negotiate in good faith. This does not mean we should not talk (the North Koreans, from what I can see, never negotiate in good faith but we still talk to them) but it would seem to recommend a wary approach when the talking finally begins.

There will no doubt be some who see these developments as proof that military action is the only way to deal with Iran’s nuclear ambitions; but nothing emerging from this palace coup alters the unanswered questions lingering over every proposal for attacking Iran’s nuclear infrastructure (how effective can such an attack really be? How will we address an attack’s second and third-level consequences throughout the region?). It is worth remembering here that on the nuclear issue Mousavi’s differences with Ahmedinejad are mainly about style, not substance.

The Obama administration appears concerned mainly with not painting itself into any rhetorical corners. In a situation where events are fluid, and it is unclear even who all of the key players are, that seems, at least for now, like a good policy.

Let me state at the outset that I liked the speech. It was thoughtful. It was careful. It hit the right notes. It changed the tone. That final point is crucial, because in assessing the reaction to President Barack Obama’s speech last Thursday at Cairo University one can separate out those who liked the speech from those who did not by asking this seemingly tangential question: over the last few years, has tone been an issue in American relations with the Muslim World? Might a change in tone be a useful starting place?

It was not surprising that some observers in the region dismissed the speech out of hand with calls for deeds first, words later. Hamas, in Gaza, and Iraq’s Moqtada al-Sadr both fell into this category, though even they appeared to have been impressed, albeit grudgingly, by the gesture. An array of articles in the American media charted the reactions of ordinary people from Casablanca to Calcutta who were politely dismissive of the President, welcoming his intentions but decrying his lack of policy specifics.

No one expected (or at least no one should have expected) Obama, in a single speech, to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, remake Iraq or completely alter the poisonous image of the United States that has built up throughout the Muslim World over the last seven years. But if you believe, as I do, that tone matters then it was difficult not to see the Cairo speech as an immensely successful starting point – only a gesture, perhaps, but a gesture heavy with symbolic value. Changing the tone of America’s discourse with the Muslim World had to be the first step in a long of rebuilding trust and influence.

A big part of that change in tone was the President’s acknowledgment that America’s history in the Middle East goes much further back than September 11, 2001 and that, sometimes, it has not reflected well on us. At a Washington DC party Friday night a State Department official grumbled to me about this part of the speech, wondering what purpose was served by reminding people of American failings. I replied that acknowledging the past is important because while most Americans have long forgotten, say, our stage-managed coup against Mossedeq or even our bait-and-switch reaction to the results of the 2006 Palestinian elections, few in the region have done so. Changing what we say is the first step to rebuilding America’s Middle Eastern credibility – but we must follow it up with changes to what we do, and we need to be better about doing what we say.

Obama’s election, his extraordinary personal story, his eloquence and, yes, even his middle name are all potent tools as America begins this rebuilding process. But they are only tools. It is appropriate to demand substance from this president as his policies toward the region evolve. It is equally important to appreciate the gesture he has made, and to acknowledge that rebuilding trust is going to have to be a two way street, and that it is going to take time. What we saw in Cairo Thursday was an excellent start.

A thoughtful and measured reaction to President Obama's speech in Cairo earlier today is going to require a bit of time. That should be seen as a good thing - the President is a thoughtful and measured person. Here, however, are a few quick thoughts... with more to follow later.

A good initial take, however, can be found in this NYT blog post, consisting of quick reactions from Arab students in Egypt and Jordan. For a good summary of both the speech itself and of immediate reaction around the region take a look at this round-up from the BBC. Especially noteworthy is its report (sourced to AFP) that Hamas in Gaza gave the speech a guarded welcome, saying it showed "tangible change". In the nuanced world of Middle Eastern politics that represents a significant evolution in tone.

Unfortunate, if perhaps inevitable, is this analysis from Roger Simon at Politico. Simon is one of the most important analysts of the American political scene. By judging the speech almost entirely on the basis of which lines did or did not garner applause, however, he proves that a deep knowledge of American politics does not travel especially well.

Similarly, careful analysts should ignore reporting focused on the heavy security along Obama's motorcade route and the lack of adoring crowds. Some have treated this as evidence of a chilly reception. If US newspapers still took foreign coverage seriously, they would have local correspondents in Cairo who would know that the blocking off of a motorcade route hours in advance by police standing shoulder to shoulder along its entire length has long been standard procedure in Cairo for visits like this (as well as the rare occasions when President Hosni Mubarak ventures into the city center). In these instances the police are there to prevent crowds from forming. Even the sidewalks are closed to passing pedestrians.

Aside from the fairly obvious observation that Atlanta-Dubai-Abu Dhabi-London-Vermont is an awful lot of travel to undertake in just over four days, a few observations spring to mind after this latest quick trip.

First, the growth of Dubai has hit some speed bumps, but remains both impressive in scope and slightly unsettling in its implications. There is little doubt that Dubai and its real estate-driven boom have been hit harder than most by the global economic downturn. This article, which appeared in London’s The Independent last Thursday, offers a glimpse of Dubai’s building frenzy in what may prove to be its terminal throes. Even allowing that a lot of construction sites are now sitting idle, it remains astonishing how far down the road toward Abu Dhabi the Dubai sprawl now creeps. The ‘unsettling’ part comes from the fact that we still do not know how deep and broad the financial damage to the emirate has really been and, as The Independent article seems to indicate, finding out is going to be very difficult.

Second, Abu Dhabi has changed a lot since my last visit in 2005. Unlike Dubai, however, the change has less to do with cosmetics than with the structure of the city and government themselves. There is a concerted attempt to modernize and systematize public administration in the emirate. The website of Abu Dhabi’s Executive Council (the main governing body of Abu Dhabi, as opposed to the broader federal government of the UAE) states that the emirate aspires to be “among the five best governments in the world” (when I asked a senior local official who the current five are he mentioned Singapore and the Netherlands). The longer-term question is whether this aspiration can really be translated into reality in a city-state that remains, for all practical purposes, a privately-held family business.

Third, the wave of goodwill President Barack Obama is now riding should not be underestimated. One Abu Dhabian, upon discovering I am American, went on at length about how impressed he was by President Obama’s respectful behavior while visiting a mosque in Turkey last month. This was only the most striking of several such conversations over the course of my trip. Of course, high expectations can also lead to bitterly dashed hopes, so with opportunity comes danger. Still, it was nice to make an overseas trip in which every conversation did not begin on a confrontational note. It has been a while since that happened.